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Purpose 
This paper is written in memory of the late Stafford Beer. The paper engages 
with only one dimension of the whole man: Stafford Beer as the diagnostician 
and prognostician of the social conditions that he so keenly observed. 
Design/methodology/approach 
The paper revisits a talk that Stafford Beer gave, over three decades ago, to 
administrators of the UK National Health Service (NHS). It uses the content of 
the talk, entitled “Health and Quiet Breathing”, to diagnose the problems that 
have been encountered in the development of NHS information management 
strategies. The paper concludes with some brief personal recollections of 
Stafford Beer as a friend and as a teacher. 
Findings 
The paper finds Stafford Beer’s managerial cybernetics to be a useful tool in 
understanding many of the problems that have beset NHS information 
management strategies: lack of operational research, problems in the 
commodification of information, financial scandal, and bureaucracy.  In its 
examination of these issues, the paper recognises Stafford Beer’s status as a 
legatee of not only Norbert Wiener, but also of the great philosophers. 
Value 
The paper demonstrates how the problem-orientation of Stafford Beer’s 
managerial cybernetics continues to be fresh and relevant to today’s society 
and provides a brief portrait of him both as a friend and as a teacher. 
Introduction 
Stafford Beer rejected many of the commonplace categories that are used to 
typify our world. That this was so is surely suggested by a recent feature about 
him in Great Britain’s Guardian newspaper. Its otherwise lucid correspondent 
described Stafford as “part scientist, part management guru, part social and 
political theorist” (Beckett, 2003). We smiled when we read this ungainly label 
- for it was easy to visualise a disconcertedly raised eyebrow on a heavily 
bearded face. The face quipped: “And what of the system that would emerge 
from the coupling of such parts?” 
 These opening remarks serve to illustrate the difficulties in remembering the 
whole of Stafford Beer by means of black ink on white paper. Indeed, Stafford, 
as we remember him, was not particularly fond of labels and regarded most 
‘either / or’ dichotomies as constitutionally suspect. In offering a description of 
himself, he would have perhaps been more inclined to cite an ancient Vedantic 
teaching: “that action is entirely the outcome of all the modes of nature’s 
attributes”. Indeed, perhaps there is only one commonly held category that 
could apply to Stafford Beer without dint of a crude distortion: Stafford was a 
philosopher and his love of wisdom was a powerful one. 
 Yet Stafford Beer’s philosophy was not in the least bound to ivory tower 
contemplation. In every sense his was a practical philosophy to be tested by 
direct involvement in the world of affairs. Moreover, the problem that 
confronts us, in writing to his memory, is encapsulated in one of his many 
maxims: “Ashby’s law of requisite variety will always assert itself”. 
Thankfully, the man himself provides some much needed variety 
amplification: 
I have read that I have the reputation of being a prophet whose oracles come true. It is 
nonsense... What I do is study the systems which society has underwritten and in which firms 
are embedded (Beer, 1975a,p289). 
This quotation is from Platform for Change; a book that is perhaps the best 
testament of the extent to which Stafford Beer carried his philosophy into the 
world of affairs. For the book was a challenge to “reading habits, thinking 
habits, running-the-world habits” (Beer, 1975b,p2). It was partly comprised of 
fifteen Arguments of Change - fifteen different statements and public lectures 
that sought to relate cybernetics to fifteen different, but specific, social 
contexts or problems. The statements ranged from an inaugural presidential 
address to the Operational Research Society of Great Britain, to a memorial 
lecture to a Police college, to a presentation to a committee of the House of 
Representatives of the United States of America. Many years later Beer 
described this project thus: 
...the whole year was devoted to designing different statements, specific to their audiences, 
which between them would be a vehicle for a more encompassing intention. This was to 
express the relevance of the new science of cybernetics to holism, and to propose it as a new 
worldview. Insofar as key cybernetic interests were concerned, to illustrate them in all those 
different contexts should buttress the thinking (Beer, 2000,p565). 
It follows that this paper’s requisite variety of remembrance manifests itself in 
an engagement with only one dimension of the whole man: Stafford Beer as 
the diagnostician and prognostician of the social conditions that he so keenly 
observed. In particular, it will examine the context of just one Argument of 
Change: the British National Health Service (Beer, 1975c). The intention is to 
relate the Argument, which Stafford entitled “Health and Quiet Breathing”, to 
the events that have unfolded in the thirty-three intervening years. In 
establishing that relation, the paper discusses Stafford Beer’s development of a 
managerial cybernetics of organization and recognises his status as an 
intellectual legatee of not only Norbert Wiener, but also the great philosophers. 
The paper concludes with some brief personal recollections of Stafford Beer as 
a friend and teacher. 
An Argument of Change: Health and Quiet Breathing 
Health and Quiet Breathing was a lunchtime talk, delivered in 1970, to 
administrators of the British National Health Service (NHS). It addressed the 
problems that Stafford believed confronted the organization at that time, the 
remedies that he believed to be available, and the possibilities that he held the 
future to hold. The transcript of this talk is full strength Beer bottled for all 
time - amusing and ebullient, but also devastating in its criticism and 
courageous in its visionary ambition (Beer, 1975c). As this paper will seek to 
demonstrate, three decades on it reads like a haunting presentiment of future 
events. Indeed, it was not only ahead of its time three decades ago - in some 
respects it is ahead of the present time. 
 Its initial suggestion was that the problems of management are always multi-
faceted and as such they should be studied in the context of the system 
generating them. Any such study should deploy science - the “codified 
understanding of how things are and how things work; insight made rigorous; 
the general educed from particulars” (Beer, 1975c,p87). The application of 
science to the complex problems of management represents the essential 
meaning of operational research (OR). As such OR relies upon the 
construction of a model, open to experimentation, which stands as a surrogate 
for the system in which the problem is perceived to reside. 
 These opening definitions led Beer to observe that there was scope to apply 
OR at every level of NHS organization: “...the queue... someone should make 
it clear that you spell antenatal with an ‘e’ not an ‘i’ ” (1975c,p89). But also 
that “the big model of the entire health service should and could be built” 
using “cybernetic models of (the) various ways in which viable systems come 
to be organized” (1975c,p93). This latent potential for beneficial change was 
contrasted with Beer’s own diagnosis of the 1970 NHS: 
... three monolithic blocks: the hospitals, general practices, and local health authorities... an 
introverted organization, preoccupied with its own antecedents, its internal power struggles, 
its levels of status, its costs and its wages, which solves its management problems in 
equations of political factors and psychological stress (Beer, 1975c,pp88-89). 
As a consequence, Beer proposed that the purpose of the NHS was all but lost 
from view; his own opinion was proffered in these terms: 
... my suggestion would be that we think of a health service as regulative. We look for a 
stable society in which factors affecting healthiness are under control... Society is a very 
large system made up of individual people... we ought to start with them. Now we can define 
the health status of every person - if only by calling him ill or not ill; but of course a good 
recording system would offer a much richer account than this. At the moment, such an 
account could exist, but does not - because of organizational fragmentation and archaic 
methods of recording and storing facts (Beer, 1975c,p88). 
It was on this basis that Stafford offered his vision: 
In... this lies a beginning for the reformulation of the way that hospitals are run - a 
reformulation based on the notion that what happens in a hospital is all about information 
and its transformations. If you could study the hospital wearing spectacles which allowed you 
to see the movement of information and nothing else, you would understand both the 
medicine and the administration - and just how the two fail to interact... You would trace the 
loops of information that culminated in a very ill patient crawling out of bed to a public 
telephone - to ring up the hospital and ask how he was... you would mark the information 
filters that substitute ‘as well as expected’ for actual information. You would trace the 
information network by which nurses and sisters know what to do for their patients (Beer, 
1975c,pp91-92). 
Hence, Stafford’s vision for the NHS, over thirty years ago, was of an 
integrated total system, modelled on, what for him, were the invariant 
structural mechanisms of viable systems and managed with the assistance of 
operational research. As such, he foresaw that such an integrated system would 
revolve around access to an electronic health record that was patient based. 
This vision had an acknowledged concern: 
I am fully aware of the problems of confidentiality posed by effective and consolidated 
electronic files. They can and will be solved (Beer, 1975c,p91). 
The Course of NHS History: A Nightmare in Several Acts 
The course of history, over the decades since Beer’s talk, has not been kind to 
the British NHS. This is particularly so of the NHS in England, where the 
development and implementation of information management and technology 
(IM&T) strategies has become a form of nightmare in several acts. 
 Act One began in 1983, some thirteen years after Health and Quiet 
Breathing, with the Griffiths’ inquiry into NHS organization and management 
(Griffiths, 1983). However, in contrast to Beer’s call for operational research, 
the cybernetic modelling of NHS organizational structure, and the importance 
that he placed on patient based records, the Griffiths’ inquiry recommended 
the appointment of a hierarchy of general managers throughout the NHS. At 
the hospital level, these managers were to be supported by an information 
system to be called ‘Management Budgeting’. The aim of Management 
Budgeting was: 
... to provide an unsophisticated system in which workload related budgets covering financial 
and manpower allocations and full overhead costs are closely related to workable service 
objectives and against which performance and progress can be measured (Pratt, 1986,p62). 
This objective was subsequently pursued in a variety of guises throughout the 
late 1980s and 1990s. Act Two involved the commitment of £445 million in 
support of the ‘Resource Management Initiative’ (DHSS, 1986; HMT, 
1990;1991;1992). Within hospitals, this initiative pursued the development of 
a ‘case mix’ management system: a software application capable of classifying 
patients into medically meaningful, iso-resource groups for budgeting 
purposes. The difficulties experienced in delivering such an application, at any 
English hospital, led to Act Three: the ‘Hospital Information Support Systems 
Initiative’. This was piloted, with mixed success, primarily at just three 
hospitals - but to the cost of £56 million (NAO, 1996). Around the same time, 
the Wessex Regional Health Authority independently pursued a similar 
initiative. This project resulted in the loss of £43m amidst allegations of 
conflicting interests and managerial impropriety (PAC, 1993). 
 Nevertheless, the failure of these initiatives to deliver robust, case mix 
sensitive data on hospital costs and activity did nothing to stop Act Four 
unfolding: the negotiation of contracts throughout the 1990s in support of the 
NHS internal market in secondary health care (DoH, 1989). This was an 
attempt by the then Conservative government to introduce a quasi-market 
model into NHS health care delivery. It involved NHS ‘self governing trust’ 
hospitals contracting to supply health care to publicly funded NHS health 
authorities and general practitioners (GPs); the latter being responsible for the 
purchase of such care on behalf of patients. 
 The internal market mechanism became widely acknowledged as a disaster 
for the NHS. In the absence of data that related the costs of care to the clinical 
complexity of any given case, the information on which the quasi-contracts 
were negotiated was hopelessly inadequate (Seng et al, 1993). For instance, the 
crude average specialty cost per episode of care - on which contracts were 
necessarily negotiated in the absence of case mix sensitive data - could result 
in spectacular shortfalls in revenue for NHS hospitals. This could happen 
whenever the case mix severity of their referred patients changed 
unexpectedly. This resulted in bed closures, for instance, at the Wessex 
Neurological Centre, England (Neil-Dwyer, 1992). Elsewhere, the reliance on 
crude average-cost pricing opened significant opportunities for gaming 
behaviour on the part of the purchaser bodies in the NHS. In particular, GPs 
were able to ‘cream skim’ simple consultative and surgical procedures from 
their local hospitals by conducting them ‘in-house’. One reported example was 
the increased ratio of complex to simple dermatological cases that were 
referred by a large GP practice to the capital intensive Queen’s Medical Centre 
in Nottingham, England. This undermined the financial viability of the 
hospital’s dermatological service, which had absorbed its capital costs into its 
‘market prices’ on the assumption that the volume and case mix of its referrals 
would remain stable (Millard, 1992). 
 These catastrophic failures in information management were integral to the 
development of Act Five: the spending of a further £152m by the central 
management of the English NHS in support of a strategy to meet the 
administrative requirements of the NHS internal market (NHSE, 1992; NAO, 
1999). A key component of this expenditure came to be investigated by 
auditors, amidst allegations of financial malpractice and conflicts of interest 
(NAO, 1998). Elsewhere, a clearing system was established that centralised 
the settlement of all payments to hospitals arising from patient referrals under 
the internal market. The clearing system subsequently fed its data, on all of the 
secondary health care episodes in England, to a central database. These 
systems spurred the nation’s medical profession into open protest during 1995 
and 1996, because of concerns about their security, and their failure to 
adequately consider the protection of patient confidentiality (Anderson, 
1996;1998). 
The Present NHS Strategy: The Past Revisited (In Part) 
The formulation of an understanding of such chronic mis-management should 
be of considerable importance to an organization that is, by almost any 
conceivable measure, the United Kingdom’s largest organization and also one 
that has created 24,000 general management posts since 1983 (DoH, 2000). 
Indeed, one notable feature of the troubled history that we have briefly 
outlined is illustrated by these very statistics - the emphasis that was placed on 
‘managing’ the NHS by appointing a hierarchy of general managers. Once 
appointed, the emphasis passed to attempts to collect data on the cost of health 
care activities. Hence, in sharp contrast to the thrust of Beer’s talk, there was 
very little emphasis placed on organizing and informing the delivery of health 
care by doctors and nurses. 
 Indeed, it was against this backdrop that the current NHS information 
management strategy, Information for Health (NHSE, 1998), was formulated 
under the overview of a Labour government. In his foreword to the strategy, 
the then Secretary of State for Health observed that: “Up to now the use of IT 
in the NHS has not been a success story. Far from it. Lots of money has been 
wasted” (Dobson, 1998). The perceived reasons for this were acknowledged 
by the strategy document itself: 
... the previous strategy... was over-concerned with management information, and failed to 
address the real need of the NHS for information... The new strategy will be based on 
...delivering the information required to support day-to-day clinical practice... Most NHS 
organisations depend on traditional paper based clinical records... The NHS will need to 
increase the pace of its take up of new information technology... The arguments for a move 
towards an electronic (health) record are compelling (NHSE, 1998,p15-24). 
Clearly, not so compelling as to have been recognised in the twenty-eight 
intervening years since Stafford Beer’s Health & Quiet Breathing address. 
Nevertheless, Information for Health initially exhibits a first rate systemic 
sensibility. Indeed, the strategy explicitly recognises that IT should be 
deployed on a ‘problem pull’ rather than ‘technology push’ basis: 
An information strategy for the NHS must be driven primarily by a careful and 
comprehensive analysis of the information needed to support service objectives... and not 
simply by the technical possibilities (NHSE, 1998,p13). 
It is unfortunate that in other respects this lengthy document is left wanting - 
especially in comparison to the insightful brevity of Health & Quiet Breathing. 
Indeed, its request for an analysis of information needs is at the expense of the 
synthesis so clearly present in Health & Quiet Breathing. For instance, 
Information for Health fails to acknowledge the dearth of extant operational 
research into the adequacy of the communication channels that presently link 
health care professionals. This shortfall was identified by Smith and Preston 
(1996) amidst evidence that the problems with current communication 
channels are legion. Similarly, Information for Health fails to acknowledge the 
importance of basic event scheduling for the NHS - despite the manifest 
evidence that many NHS hospitals fail to utilise their beds and operating 
theatres efficiently (NAO, 1988; Audit Commission, 1992; Buchanan and 
Wilson, 1996; Boaden, et al 1999). Moreover, the strategy does not explore the 
contention that commonplace designs in computing and communication tools 
are inappropriate to the specialised ergonomics of the healthcare environment. 
For instance, the contention that personal computer based applications, with 
their origins in the office environment, do not serve the communication needs 
of more mobile healthcare workers at all well (Coiera, 1998). 
On the Commodification of Information in the NHS 
Stafford Beer acknowledged three mentors in many of his publications on the 
managerial cybernetics of organization: Norbert Wiener, Ross Ashby and 
Warren McCulloch. To Beer, this trinity represent the grandfathers of 
cybernetics (Beer 1981; 1994). It follows that the content of Health & Quiet 
Breathing is, at least in part, underwritten by Wiener’s exploration of the 
relationship of information and its communication to the control of processes 
through time (Wiener, 1961). In essence, in a stochastic cosmos, there can be 
no management without information management - that was Wiener’s legacy - 
that was also the observation of Health & Quiet Breathing. But what is the 
value of information? Is it a commodity that can be valued? 
 Such questions are of considerable importance to the NHS given the 
paradoxical insistence in Information for Health that NHS Trust hospitals 
compile a ‘business case’ in support of major IT investments (NHSE, 1998). 
Any such case would detail the costs and benefits of the investment proposal. 
On this basis, a project with a positive business case is approved by the central 
NHS management executive and the NHS Trust would be authorised to 
finance the project’s investment costs by borrowing through privately financed 
loans that are repaid by public revenue allocations (DoH, 1999). But what are 
the financial benefits of improved information and communication flows in a 
public service NHS hospital? The NHS strategists would do well to consider 
Norbert Wiener:  
What makes a thing a good commodity? Essentially that it can pass from hand to hand with 
the substantial retention of its value and that the pieces of this commodity should combine 
additively in the same way as the money that paid for them. The power to conserve itself is a 
very convenient property for a commodity to have... Information on the other hand, cannot 
be conserved easily... What has been said before may not be worth saying again... It is only 
independent information that is even approximately additive... derivative information is far 
from independent of what has gone before (Wiener, 1968,p102-104). 
Hence, in economic terms, information has some strange characteristics. We 
cannot live without it, but once it is available it will prove difficult to control – 
the ‘consumption’ of information by one party does not preclude its 
consumption by another. Moreover, once some information is fully available 
no one is left wanting more of the same. In the vocabulary of neo classical 
economics, information cannot be viewed as a pure private good – rather it has 
many of the characteristics of a public good (Olson, 1965). 
 Moreover, throughout the 1990s, the managers of NHS Trust hospitals were 
partly held to account by the internal market mechanism - being required to 
achieve a target rate of financial return on their net assets (DoH, 1999). It 
follows that for an individual hospital, given the public good characteristics of 
information, there could be plenty of cash costs but no obvious cash benefits to 
be realised from an improved information management infrastructure. Indeed, 
there would, in all likelihood, have been financial disincentives at the local 
level to investing in the IM&T infrastructure that would have enabled the 
creation of an electronic health record - the very infrastructure that Information 
for Health championed. 
 Unfortunately, Information for Health fails to recognise these paradoxical 
difficulties except in an extremely limited sense. At one juncture, the strategy 
highlights the nature of this problem in a brief discussion of how to finance the 
messaging costs of an NHS intranet called NHSnet: 
... reluctance to fully exploit the NHSnet stems partly from... concerns across the NHS about 
the burden of messaging costs and the uneven distribution of costs and benefits between 
different parts of the service... A simple and pragmatic solution... would be to top-slice 
funding and central payment of the messaging costs of the net (NHSE, 1998,p54). 
This begs the question as to why, on this specific issue, the problem of the 
value of information and the financing of its production and distribution is 
recognised, but the general difficulty is ignored. 
On NHS Bureaucracy & Financial Scandal 
The study of mechanisms in inanimate nature may be conducted as a scientific 
inquiry. As such it requires faith in the existence of an order of things - but it is 
an inquiry that is not contested by that order. In Wiener’s terms: 
To discover the secrets of nature requires a powerful and elaborate technique, but at least we 
can expect one thing - that as far as inanimate nature goes any step forward that we may 
make will not be countered by a change of policy by nature for the deliberate purpose of 
confusing and frustrating us... nature plays fair (Wiener, 1968,p163). 
However, Wiener also recognised that the interaction of animate mechanisms - 
with opposing ends - might exhibit the characteristics of a contest. In Masani’s 
terms: 
... what are often accepted as inquiries or analyses are in reality steps and counter-steps of an 
ongoing invisible contest between different vested interests (Masani, 1997,p339). 
Hence, on the one hand, a scientific inquiry into inanimate nature will have to 
surmount the dissipative effects on measurement of the natural noise that is 
generated by nature. But on the other hand, an inquiry into animate nature - for 
instance an enquiry into an administrative system - may have to also surmount 
the additional noise that is intentionally generated by human agents in pursuit 
of an opposing end (Masani, 1997). 
 For the late P.R. Masani, human noise in administration merely reflects the 
nature of what he called ‘Homo- peccator’ (i.e. sinful man). It is, at least in 
part, born of traits in the human make-up: “conceit, avarice and jealousy... 
dishonesty, hypocrisy, deceitfulness and treachery” (Masani, 1997,p340). The 
cybernetic implications of such ‘human noise’ are not easily unravelled, but 
for Masani, Homo peccator will act to limit the possible application of 
cybernetic thinking to a social organization like the NHS: 
... administration is marred by teleological human noise... the execution of a policy will be 
distorted by the human noise within and without (the) system and... the eradication of this 
noise may involve contest (Masani, 1997, pp346-347). 
 Furthermore, Masani (1997, p353) claims that public service organisations 
may well contain a particular form of “noise atmosphere”: that which is borne 
by bureaucratic structure and process. For Masani, the potential ‘noise’ of a 
bureaucracy is well exemplified by C. Northcote Parkinson’s infamous 
satirical ‘laws’. For example: 
1. The Rising Pyramid. In a bureaucracy, work expands to fill the time 
available for its completion. This follows from the fact that both work and 
staff numbers can be artificially manufactured by internal minute writing and 
the exchange of memorandum (Parkinson, 1957). 
2. Expenditure Rises To Meet Income. A publicly financed bureaucracy regards 
the public revenue as limitless and as such its expenditure rises eternally 
(Parkinson, 1960). 
3. Delay Is A Form Of Denial. A bureaucracy will attempt to delay innovative 
proposals, precisely because they are innovative, beyond the life or career span 
of the would-be reformer (Parkinson, 1970). 
 It would appear that the nightmare years of NHS IM&T strategy failure have 
been rich in both teleological human noise and bureaucratic noise. In support 
of this claim, one might cite the creation of a pyramid of 24,000 managers 
between 1983 and 2000 (DoH, 2000), the catalogue of multi-million pound 
financial scandals (PAC 1993; NAO, 1996; NAO, 1998), and the withering 
criticism of the bureaucratic ineptitude of the central NHS management 
executive (Anderson, 1998). 
 Let us move this paper towards its conclusion by asking an important 
question, namely, what can science say about effective business organization 
when it has to speak against the deafening noise of homo peccator and 
bureaucracy? 
Diagnosing the NHS System 
Stafford Beer’s prolific writings on the application of cybernetics to 
management and enterprise addressed this question in a novel, but none the 
less powerful way. In this regard, we should look towards what lies behind a 
request in Beer’s Health & Quiet Breathing talk - a request whose meaning 
was, in all probability, something of a mystery to his audience at the time. This 
was the request for “cybernetic models of (the) various ways in which viable 
systems come to be organized” (Beer, 1975c,p93). 
 For Beer (1974;1975d;1985) cybernetics is the science of effective 
organization. An organization is a regulated mechanism; it must be or it would 
not be perceived by anyone as an organization. Yet the processes by which 
such organization is achieved are usually too complex and unintelligible to be 
fathomed by the outside observer. In the terminology of cybernetics, they are 
systems of enormous ‘variety’ and the organization is a ‘black box’ (Ashby, 
1964; Beer 1979). 
 Nevertheless, one observable feature of some organizations is their capacity 
to go ‘on and on’. For instance, consider ‘the organized general practice of 
medicine’ or ‘the organized hospital practice of surgery and medicine’. Several 
English hospitals display an organized continuity that can be traced back 
centuries. The doctors change, the nurses change, the patients come and go, 
but the ‘box’ goes on and on. In cybernetic terms, its organization is regulated 
by feedback and homeostatic systems of enormous complexity (Ashby, 1964; 
Beer, 1979). These systems seek to supply requisite variety to the regulatory 
task; to do so they must seek to absorb variety with variety (Ashby, 1964; 
Beer, 1979). 
 One potent force for such stability in the practice of medicine must surely 
derive from the belief and knowledge structures, the value systems and the 
conventions of the professional groups involved. In the face of limited 
perturbations, these mechanisms will enable a continued coherence - no matter 
who is involved. Indeed, in the face of a medical emergency, it is a good thing 
for all involved that it is sheer professionalism that cybernetically ‘takes 
control’. However, there may be a cybernetic downside to the maintenance of 
such stability (Beer, 1974;1975e). This is the downside that the NHS has been 
slipping down in its nightmare years of continued information management 
failure. 
 First, a black box may well be perceived, from a metasystemic vantage point, 
to be a mere part of a wider system. The box itself will recognise such 
relationships. Indeed, a string of esoteric boxes may be involved with one 
another. However, they are unlikely to collaborate and manage such 
relationships in the synoptic terms and interests of the higher order 
metasystem. On the contrary, they will act on the terms that maintain their own 
integrity (Beer, 1975e). This is an important origin of many of the 
communication and scheduling problems that characterise the NHS. 
 A second difficulty is that the very stability of the box may result in its 
procedures becoming antiquated when considered from the perspective of a 
metasystem. For instance, the box is unlikely to exploit a technological 
advance that makes its own mode of organization obsolete. Hence, whilst the 
box may be perceived as an operational part of a higher order system, if that 
system lacks adequate material embodiment, it will be unable to restructure 
itself in its own interest. Indeed, it may well have no existence other than 
through the eye of a beholder (Beer, 1975e). It is by this process that aspects 
of the NHS become ‘unmodern’ and Government policy makers subsequently 
champion an agenda of public service ‘modernisation’. 
 Third, the would-be reformer, frustrated by the opacity of the box and 
lacking sympathy with the perceived nature of its output, may well attempt to 
make it more transparent or attempt to alter the content of its inputs. But the 
very complexity of the box means that it cannot easily be made transparent. 
Similarly, the very stability of the box allows it to adjust to perturbations - but 
without adjusting its cherished output. Further reforms might ensue, with an 
even greater range and frequency. Critically, as Beer (1974;1975e) was fond of 
noting, if their size and rate of arrival exceeds the ability of the box to adjust to 
them, then instability, protestations, crisis, and quite possibly collapse will 
ensue. It is partly by this process that the NHS came to waste several hundred 
million pounds in the pursuit of an oxymoron: “...an unsophisticated system in 
which workload related budgets... are closely related to workable service 
objectives and against which progress and performance can be measured.” It 
is also by this process that the NHS management executive became engaged in 
a dispute with its own medical employees over the confidentiality of patient 
records. 
On the Recurring Need for a NHS Meta System 
For Stafford Beer (1975b;1997), such difficulties are cybernetically inevitable 
if problems are approached in the absence of a cybernetic sensibility. Indeed, 
one of the central components of the thesis derived in Platform for Change 
was that in the absence of such a sensibility, both business and society would 
be characterised by logically un-decidable propositions. These will generate 
contested arguments that cannot be satisfactorily resolved without recourse to 
a logically higher order metasystem that embodies a suitably endorsed 
regulatory model and employs a suitable metalanguage (Beer, 1975b). For 
Beer (1975b;1979), Masani’s notions of “teleological human noise” or 
“bureaucratic noise” can only be addressed if they are understood in the 
language of a logically higher-order metasystem. Consequently, for Beer, 
scientific inquiry appears to once again become possible, but only in a 
diagnostic sense via a ‘principle of completion from without’ (Beer, 
1966;1967;1979,1985). Moreover, for Beer (1974;1975d), a most important 
principle for such a completion is the criterion that systems survive in both the 
short and the long term through learning, adaptation and evolution. This is the 
criterion that they are viable (Beer, 1979). Such a criterion can be applied 
recursively, extending itself over the many dimensions of formal and informal 
organization: 
As long as oppression and freedom are seen solely as normative values, the outcome is 
determined by self-interest. Then we get polarization, and people will fight to the death for a 
prospect which is in either case not viable. But if we raise our eyes to the higher level of the 
total system in designing... controls, and use the viability criterion as the balance point, 
liberty must be a computable function of effectiveness for any total system whose objectives 
are known (Beer, 1975d, p428). 
Of course, the possibility of designing a metasystem depends on systemic 
purpose as perceived and the establishment of generalised cybernetic laws that 
govern viability (Beer, 1974). If such laws are established, it follows that in 
principle, in so far as survival is concerned, it is not any person’s or 
organization’s liberty that stands to be lost by the filtration of Masani’s notions 
of human teleological and/or bureaucratic noise. It is merely the license to 
denature the very system in which such liberty is exercised (Beer, 1975d; 
1975f). It follows from this that a ‘Parkinsonian’ bureaucracy, whose only 
perceived output is the maintenance of its own bureaucratic organization, 
would not constitute such a metasystem. On the contrary, such a bureaucracy 
may well be diagnosed as parasitic to the logically lower order system; 
flourishing at its expense (Beer, 1974;1979). 
 For some, this is the bête noir of management cybernetics and the reason 
why Stafford Beer attracted so many polemics (e.g. Adams, 1973; Rivett, 
1977). Yet as Beer helpfully points out: 
The meta system must make some intervention, and should make only that degree of 
intervention that is required to maintain cohesiveness in a viable system... Freedom is in 
principle a computable function of systemic purpose as perceived. That is the explosive 
conclusion. It is explosive precisely because it sounds heartless, whereas the dear question of 
freedom is full of heart. The trouble seems to be that people do not like to believe that any 
matter of passion for them could possibly be bound by scientific rules, forgetting that the 
passion itself is limited by the rules of their own physiological capability to endure it (Beer, 
1979,p158). 
Beer’s epic exploration of how systems are viable is well chronicled (Beer, 
1979;1981;1985;1989;2000). It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully 
recount his Viable System Model. However, an essential feature is the principle 
of recursiveness. This always enables the notion of a metasystem to be 
explored. Moreover, the model elucidates how the problem of requisite variety 
in regulation can be explored and how a metasystem must be structured if the 
criterion of viability is to be upheld. A major feature is the cybernetic 
requirement that each metasystem embodies a model of the system that it seeks 
to regulate. 
 In the NHS, the notion of the metasystem appears to be continually 
uncharted and under explored. This applies to the multiple recursive levels of 
the many dimensions of the total health care system (Beer, 1985). How else 
could an organization continually fail to communicate and schedule its own 
cross boundary processes? How else could an organization come to be in 
dispute with its own staff over questions of patient privacy and confidentiality? 
How else could multiple projects end in financial scandal? 
The Great Philosophers 
It pays to reflect on the magnitude of the issues that Stafford Beer sought to 
address. “For the subject of our argument is no trifling matter. It is the 
question of the right manner of life” (Plato, s352). 
 Stafford Beer’s managerial cybernetics raised questions of governance in the 
tradition of Plato’s Republic and Hobbe’s Leviathan. But such was the 
compass of his learning and his commitment to holism, that Beer perceived 
possible answers and invariant principles where others saw only abstruse 
research. For instance, the importance that Beer placed on the diagnosis of 
social problems in terms of the absence of logically higher order meta-systems 
gathered inspiration from Bertrand Russell’s research into the logical 
paradoxes generated by “the assemblage of all classes that are not members of 
themselves” (Russell, 1920,p136). It is reported that Russell declared that he 
knew of only six people who had read all of this research (Strathern, 2001). 
One is left wondering if Stafford Beer was one of those six people. 
Conclusion 
We have written this paper in memory of the late Stafford Beer. For those 
familiar with the man and his works that intention may well be recognised as 
overly ambitious. For two things can surely be said about Beer: he thought for 
himself and he thought about big issues. For those reasons, this paper’s 
requisite variety of remembrance has manifested itself in remembering only 
one dimension of Stafford - his status as a constructive social critic. At one 
level, we have sought to demonstrate how his problem-orientation continues to 
be fresh and relevant to today’s society. But at another level we have sought, 
in a minor way, to recount Beer’s status not only as the founding father of the 
managerial cybernetics of organization, but also as a legatee of the great 
philosophers. For how else can one represent a man who used cybernetics to so 
rigorously explore the concept of human freedom? 
Epilogue: Some Personal Recollections 
In October 1998, Stafford Beer accepted an invitation to become a Visiting 
Professor to our University. It was as a result of this that we came to know 
him. In the years between 1998 and 2001, Stafford made many visits to our 
University to teach in his Socratic mode. 
 The Socratic symposium was a forum that suited Stafford intellectually, 
pedagogically and physically. The only entry condition he set was that 
participants should come with a specific question in hand and also have some 
familiarity with any of the wide canon of his works – including his poetry. At 
the symposia, Stafford gave generously of his ideas and he relished the chance 
to explain and extend his thoughts in debate. On the other hand, he did expect 
that discussants would at least start from a position of some knowledge. The 
debates typically ranged widely. The domains were as likely to include biology 
as theology, politics as business systems, philosophy as law. Similarly, 
Stafford was as anxious to expose what he considered to be the foibles of 
current political leaders as he was to reminiscence on his work in Chile for 
President Salvador Allende. Stafford’s deep hurt from this period was obvious, 
but never worn on his sleeve. His concern always turned towards the present or 
the future. For him the past provided an opportunity to learn from the course of 
history – as long as it was interpreted with a systemic sensibility. In this 
regard, the obvious failures of Western societies did not escape Stafford’s 
ironic commentary.  
 The make-up of the participants at the symposia mirrored the attention that 
managerial cybernetics has received in what should be its homeland of 
University Business Schools. Those who grasped the opportunity to debate 
with Stafford were typically enthusiasts, drawn from a wide range of 
disciplines inside and outside business, recent graduates and research students, 
keen to find out more. There were also a number of senior managers, from 
both inside and outside the University, who appreciated the compass of Beer’s 
strategic vision and who met with him where and when they could. 
 As a man, we found him to be an inspiration. When Stafford considered 
himself to be available, he was always keen to engage with people of all ages 
and all backgrounds, generous with both his time and his knowledge. Stafford 
was especially fond of recounting his memories of the founding figures of 
cybernetics – he had known Norbert Wiener, Warren McCulloch and Ross 
Ashby and was anxious that future generations read their works and celebrate 
their memory. Such discussions would often roll on into the early hours – later 
in the bar. On the other hand, Stafford liked time to himself – to pause, to 
meditate and to read the daily newspaper. That was often how we would find 
him, sat quietly in a grand hotel’s lounge overlooking the Sea: Rari nautes in 
gurgite vasto. 
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